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In Charity for Moral Reason, Katharina Stevens asks the question: Are there moral 
reasons for being charitable when engaging in argument with interlocutors?  Stevens’ answer is 
that indeed there are prima facie moral reasons for a kind of charity and it applies in all cases of 
argument with an interlocuter.  Stevens’ version of charity is stronger than Govier’s (1987) more 
moderate account and though it applies in all cases where we are in an argument with another 
(Argument2) it does so to a greater or lesser degree depending on context and argument 
structure.  
In terms of moral reasons for being charitable, Stevens provides two arguments. The first 
is a deontological argument that concludes with the claim that not applying a principle of charity 
in argument with an interlocuter results in humiliation or as Stevens describes it, “the denial of 
owed respect.” The second is a consequentialist argument that concludes with the claim that a 
failure to apply a principle of charity results in a harm to one’s interlocuter in that she is not 
understood as providing reasons or contributing meaningfully to the argument. Another way of 
thinking of this harm, according to Stevens, is that the interlocuter is treated as an ‘outsider’ 
unworthy of being treated as a participant in the argument. While Stevens’ recognizes that this 
harm may be felt in varying degrees depending on the arguer and the context, there is 
nevertheless a prima facie moral reason to apply charity to avoid inflicting unnecessary harm.  
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As Stevens summarizes, “I rely so heavily on considerations based on the importance of 
respecting dignity and of expressly treating others as valuable and valued members of the 
community.”  
Stevens also considers a moral argument against charity. She cites Govier’s very succinct 
concern:  
A fundamental problem is that the otherness of other minds and cultures may be lost if 
charity goes too far. It may be true that without some presumptions of shared beliefs and a 
shared logic, understanding of language is impossible. (…) With too much charity we will 
seek understanding of others to find only ourselves. (Govier, 1987) 
 
The concern with “toxic charity” as Stevens describes it, is that interpreting your interlocuter as 
reasonable can result in subsuming her claims under your own interpretive framework so that 
they conform to your own biases and assumptions. The solution to this problem for Stevens is to 
invoke Raz’s (1979) detached point of view up to the limit where it does not become a deep 
disagreement in Foeglin’s (2005) sense. As Stevens notes, some attitude or another will 
inevitably influence argument interpretation and what she is recommending is that attitude be 
charity. Nevertheless, Stevens does not believe charitable interpretation, or more precisely 
charitable listening, is easy to apply. She notes Arbor’s (2011) point that, ““Charitable listening 
that is aimed at identifying the reasonable core in another’s expressions is not only seldom 
practiced, but can also be energy and time consuming, stressful and even painful.” Despite the 
challenges however, Stevens says that charity should serve as an ideal goal in argument, “always 
pursued, never fully realized.” Her stronger version of this principle, relative to Govier’s more 
moderate charity, “…adds that we assume that our interlocutors have reasons to give that, at least 
from their point of view and in their version of how the world works, actually provide support 
for their claims.” 
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 There are a variety of important and insightful points in Stevens’ essay for argument 
theorists and teachers of logic and critical thinking. The interplay between morality, 
epistemology, and metaphysics for instance that underlie reason and argumentation. The 
important point that arguers and their interlocuters, when representing reasons, are doing 
something fundamentally human and their identity as knowers should be respected as part of a 
reasoning community. The equally important point that epistemic imperialism is a risk of toxic 
charity when an arguer with more social power and privilege, presumes to interpret an 
interlocuter on the social margins (who may have less power but greater epistemic advantages). 
In addition to these insights and contributions, I have just a few points for further consideration 
that might help develop Stevens’ argument even further. 
 The first has to do with Stevens point that “Especially where an interpreter is in an 
advantaged social position, she can easily and maybe even accidentally bulldoze all over the 
reasoning of others simply by being careless. Wherever possible, interpreters should therefore try 
to create opportunity for her interlocutors to determine whether the shape their argument takes in 
the interpreter’s hands still represents their reasons.” (p.22) I would suggest that it is often not 
carelessness that is the culprit in bulldozing over the reasoning of others with less social 
advantages, rather it is the good intentions of those with social privilege combined with the belief 
that a detached point of view really can produce epistemic benefits.  
For example, consider a case involving a colleague of mine at a different university, let’s 
call him Fred, who identifies as an activist and a male feminist at his home campus.  Fred is a 
psychology professor and at the time I recount here, was serving as a member of a campus 
committee made up mostly of female staff and students.  During a post-meeting conversation 
some how the topic of cosmetics came up and Fred began to make some claims about how 
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“unnatural” the use of cosmetics was and how much more beautiful women would look if they 
refrained from wearing lipstick and eye makeup, etc.  In addition, Fred noted the incredible 
profits made by cosmetic companies and the unethical use of animals in cosmetic testing.  He 
concluded that women should be freed from the shackles of cosmetic use and learn to love their 
“natural” and hence more beautiful selves.   
After sharing his views on cosmetics with the staff and students present at the meeting, 
Fred was shocked to find that many of the women present did not agree with him.  In fact, he 
was told by several that his comments made them angry and they strongly disagreed with his 
assessment.  Believing himself to be a feminist and a great supporter of women, Fred could not 
understand the reaction.  He was absolutely puzzled and had thought that if anything, his 
comments would have been met with enthusiastic appreciation.  How liberating it would be for 
women to hear a man criticize the use of makeup!  When he shared the story with me he said “I 
don’t get it!  These women were obviously very defensive!” 
After reconsidering his estimation that the women were simply reacting defensively he 
engaged in further conversation with at a subsequent meeting and asked for and received the 
following explanations: “I wear makeup because I like the way I look wearing it.  I don’t wear it 
to please anyone else.”  And “If I didn’t wear makeup I don’t think I would look very 
professional at work.”  And “I wear makeup because it is part of dressing up and that feels very 
feminine and fun to me.”  When recounting these explanations to me in our later conversation 
Fred attempted to use something along the lines of the principle of charity in his interpretation of 
the women’s responses.  For example he said, “I can see why they felt the need to defend a 
practice that they engage in regularly.  No one wants to feel that they are consciously making a 
bad choice every day.  But it seems to me that they are incapable of addressing the larger points 
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about women being unsatisfied with the way they look and their willingness to cave into social 
expectations that are costly and morally problematic.”  Fred came to the conclusion that the 
women at the meeting could not defend their makeup use because doing so would make explicit 
their complicit acceptance of a demeaning practice.  Ultimately, Fred interpreted the women’s 
responses as reasonable relative to their internalization of a sexist and patriarchal framework. In 
his initial attempt to interpret the women at the meeting, Fred did not consider his own particular 
identity and the properties associated with it in the context of the conversation.  His effort to 
initially find some reasonable way to interpret the staff and student reactions amounted to his 
assuming that because the women wore makeup, their defense of the practice was automatic and 
inevitable.  Though he believed they were sincere when they said that they did not feel 
compelled by his argument and that they enjoyed wearing makeup and that they felt their 
appearance with makeup was more professional, he nevertheless viewed their sincerity as the 
result of their unreflective acceptance of social pressures.  As Fred summed it up at that point “If 
the women assume that wearing makeup is actually an individual ‘choice’ and they could just as 
well choose not to--then of course their responses are reasonable.  The problem is their failure to 
see that they are all collectively responding to social pressure and not really making a choice.” 
The point of this case then is to illustrate how the principle of charity, even in Stevens’ 
stronger version, lacks a moral accounting of the interpreter’s own framework in judgments of 
another’s reasonableness or lack thereof.  Fred in this case did respect his interlocuters and he 
assumed their reasonableness. He did not commit the harm of interpreting them outside the 
bounds of reasonableness and he did seek out further evidence when he judged their initial 
reactions to be so puzzling. Yet their explanations and justifications did little to lead him to 
revise his initial interpretation.  He came to see the women as reasonable relative to an 
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oppressive framework.  Yet, Fred’s framework and starting assumptions remain unchanged.  
Further, his moral, on Stevens grounds, application of the principle of charity provides no way to 
account for the power dynamics inherit in judgments of good or bad reasoning.  While it 
provided a starting point in setting out norms of interpretation that promote fairness and avoid 
harm, charity in this case is nevertheless limited with regard to real self-reflexivity particularly in 
regard to social dynamics, privilege and power and how these factors can play a role in an 
arguer’s reconstructions of others’ reasonableness.  If I adopt a principle of charity when 
interpreting an individual whose social experiences are vastly different from my own, I run the 
risk of merely applying my experiences as “the norm” thereby missing out on the actual evidence 
and experiences the individual in question is presenting. And the point is I can do this and still be 
acting morally and with good intentions. There is a kind of paternalism inherent in this 
conception of charity if fairness and a willingness not to harm are the only moral grounds. 
Instead charity should require an awareness that the very things you assume about others and not 
yourself, may be the result of a willful ignorance of your own social advantages. In this way a 
more virtue ethics approach might be a better way to ground the moral dimensions of charity. 
Training in virtuous listening, reflexive self-awareness, and an understanding of the social 
dimensions of arguers and argument contexts could avoid some of the problematic elements of 
Fred’s interpretations of his interlocuters that perpetuate a patriarchical status quo.  
The second point has to do with assuming some of the moral responsibilities of Stevens’ 
arguer in cases where the interpreter has less social privilege than their interlocuter. Returning to 
the case of Fred, imagine one woman on the committee, a staff member in her 50s we’ll call Sue, 
who hears Fred’s argument for the “unnaturalness” of make-up and instead of thinking, “Who 
cares what this guy thinks?” or “He is in no position to pontificate about women’s cosmetic use.” 
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Instead approaches Fred’s claims as coming from an equally capable reasoner who is part of her 
community of reasoners. This would mean that Sue would need to draw Fred’s attention to the 
power differences that existed in the context between him, a tenured male professor, and the 
other participants, mostly women staff and students who were either significantly older or 
younger than he was.  Sue could ask Fred to try and imagine how the views he expressed 
regarding female beauty and “naturalness” might be felt from the point of view of older female 
staff members and younger female students.  And Sue could point out that Fred’s initial 
conclusion that the women simply defended their use of makeup because they were complicit in 
their own subjugation failed to account for how he could be creating a context where the women 
felt the need to defend themselves.  Sue could note that his pronouncements about makeup use 
are part of a larger history of men making pronouncements about what constitutes “beauty” for a 
woman and his appeal to “natural” beauty as some pure standard is itself essentialist and 
objectifying.  Sue could add that the power differentials that exist within the context could make 
it hard for the women to say outright “Who cares what you think is beautiful!” or “I don’t care 
that I’m not living up to your standards.”  For individuals in a context with less social power, Sue 
could explain, a seemingly protective defensive reaction could often be a safer alternative to 
calling out the privilege of those in power.   
In this case, the argument would certainly be more effectively shaped, with Sue’s 
contributions and it would provide new or different information for Fred. But at what cost? Sue 
shoulders the burden in this argument, raised by Fred, by having to clue him in not only to her 
perspective but the gaps in his own. And while Sue might incur risks by speaking truth to power, 
it is the additional work that she has to do to make her views more understandable to Fred that 
seems to raise the moral stakes. I worry that on Stevens’ account the greater moral labor will fall 
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on those with less social power and more to lose. Interpreting another as reasonable, when they 
are well-intentioned but socially unaware of their own privilege, is work making for the socially 
disadvantaged. Again, perhaps a more virtue-oriented approach where training in empathy, self-
awareness and self-reflexivity are central, could address some of these concerns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
